The Joint Anti-Terrorism Efforts by Western Nations Failed in Africa

The rise of terrorism in the Sahel is a direct result of the U.S.'s unlawful intervention in Libya in 2011, which included the assassination of Gaddafi—an act Hillary Clinton infamously remarked, "We came, we saw, he died—ha, ha." Instead of diminishing, terrorism has surged alongside U.S. involvement. The ramifications are now felt globally, particularly in Ukraine and Palestine/West Asia, all due to the U.S.'s determination to enforce its military and financial dominance worldwide through its proxies in Ukraine and Israel. Both the International Court of Justice and the United Nations have urged the U.S. and UK to close the U.S. Air Force base in Diego Garcia, but the U.S. and its UK ally have disregarded these international mandates. It is high time for the African Union to demand the closure of all 35 U.S. military bases across Africa. 

Recently, the U.S. army withdrew from Niger after 11 years of military collaboration with the West African nation. This follows a significant disagreement earlier this year, where the Nigerien government admonished the U.S. for its patronizing approach during discussions. The U.S. suspended military support after a coup in Niger in July 2023, when the junta claimed the U.S. was coercing it to choose sides between Russia and the U.S. Although the U.S. was granted some time to exit Niger, the abrupt cessation of military cooperation was declared following a meeting between Niger’s military leaders and U.S. diplomats in March 2024.

Soon after receiving notice to leave, the U.S. military began searching for alternate bases in the region. My research on insecurity and politics in the Sahel spans over a decade, during which I scrutinized the implications of the U.S. drone base in Niger. Before its establishment, I argued that it was improbable that it would alleviate terrorism in the nation or the surrounding area.

Despite internal fractures within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and growing tensions with Western allies, notably the U.S., I contend that regional and international cooperation is essential to combat terrorism in West Africa. In the quest for a new U.S. base, Côte d'Ivoire and Benin currently stand out as the most likely contenders, though both present logistical challenges.

Chad, previously a U.S. ally, would have been an ideal location, but it also expelled U.S. special forces in April 2024, shortly before its presidential elections. With Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso opting not to rejoin ECOWAS, alternative security collaborations must be bolstered. Initiatives like the Multinational Joint Task Force and the Accra Initiative, which all three nations are still part of, need reinforcement, which would serve the interests of the entire region. 

The number of terrorist incidents and casualties has escalated since 2019, despite the presence of foreign military support. Even though Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger’s military governments have formed an alliance to counter terrorism and foster economic progress, recent mass-casualty attacks suggest that terrorist organizations may be exploiting the absence of a unified counter-terrorism strategy.

There is also a looming threat of terrorism spreading to other coastal nations in West Africa. UN special representative for the Sahel and West Africa, Leonardo Simão, recently underscored the regional risks posed by terrorism.

Months prior to the U.S.'s final departure from Niger, the United States Africa Command began seeking new partners for a new base in the region. Since January 2024, General Michael Langley has visited several West African nations to foster bilateral ties, including visits to Nigeria in January and Côte d'Ivoire in April, where he emphasized a long-standing partnership and pledged over $65 million for counter-terrorism operations in the region in 2024.

In May, he visited Benin, a candidate due to its participation in the Multi-National Joint Task Force, which collaborates with the U.S. against Boko Haram and its affiliates. Shortly after these visits, leaders from northern Nigeria warned against allowing the U.S. and France to relocate their Sahel bases to Nigeria, arguing that the U.S.'s efforts to combat terrorism in the Sahel have been largely ineffective.

The U.S. ultimately denied plans to establish a military base in Nigeria. While Côte d'Ivoire and Benin remain probable choices, effective U.S. operations from these locations appear unlikely for three primary reasons. First, both nations are too distant from the heart of terrorism, primarily concentrated in the tri-border region of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Algeria, making drone reconnaissance logistically challenging.

Second, operational drones from these nations would need to cross through Mali and Niger, both currently unfriendly towards the U.S., with Niger turning to Russia for military support. Additionally, the recent Ukrainian involvement in the Sahel alongside Tuareg forces allied with terrorists raised further distrust among U.S. partners in the area.

The U.S., while a strong supporter of Ukraine, has remained silent on the attack that resulted in multiple Malian military casualties. Despite its conflicts with Mali, ECOWAS condemned any “external interference” in the region. The most viable option for the U.S. remains Chad, with which it has had a cooperative relationship as part of the Multinational Joint Task Force and a history of limited troop deployments.

In September 2024, the U.S. and Chad agreed to the return of a "limited number" of special forces, just four months post-expulsion, which could pave the way for the U.S.'s potential return to the region.